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John D. Blum, J.D.*

INTRODUCTION
Governance lies at the core of the American hospital and, together with the
medical staff and administration, is one of three foundational elements of
structure that is universal to all types of acute care institutions.1 The evolution
of the hospital board is tightly linked to the development, growth, and ongoing
changes in medicine that frame the acute care institution over time, and is a
matter of continuing interest to parties in health care delivery, management,
and regulation. Although various structural models of governance populate
the hospital landscape, there are considerable commonalities in overall goals
and functions of boards that make generic evaluation of governance feasible.
Examination of the commonalities in board structures and functions underscores a high level of ambiguity in how this critical function of institutional
operations ought to be cast.
There is no paucity of ideas and suggestions related to hospital board
operations, but a notable lack of foundational purpose characterizes this area.
This article explores the appropriate roles of hospital governing boards during
a time of great transition for health care in the United States. It initially
reviews the fundamental landscape of governance, highlighting basic statutory
and common-law elements that have converged to form a rather eclectic, but
complex, body of law. Second, the article explores some recent events that have
sparked a renewed interest in governance matters. These include controversies
over institutional asset changes, the national debates on charity care and
* John

J. Waldron Research Professor, Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Special thanks to Amanda Swanson for her research work on this article
and to Elizabeth A. Suffredin for her insights on community service in the acute care sector. Address
correspondence to the author via e-mail at jblum@luc.edu.
1 For an interesting historical perspective on governance, see EMANUAL HYATT ET AL., LAW OF HOSPITAL,
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT (3d ed. 1972); GEORGE D. POZGAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 127-57 (10th ed. 2006); Richard L. Johnson, The HCMR Perspective: The Purpose of Hospital
Governance, 19 HEALTHCARE MGMT. REV. 81, 81–88 (1994); ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL
AND HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION 114–30 (1998).
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community benefit obligations, and the new emphasis on board oversight of
medical care quality and the related concerns involving institutional patient
safety.
The final section posits a model for hospital governance that departs
from traditional regulatory formats. The new model would be built around
principles of management and responsive regulation that are parts of a global
legal reform movement, loosely referred to as “new governance.”
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I. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNANCE
A. A Convergence
The law per se may have very little to do with how a particular hospital
board functions on a daily basis. Other variables such as geography, tradition,
membership in a system, sponsorship, corporate member influence, local
market pressures, and financing may provide far better explanations about
how the roles and overall mission of a given hospital board are actualized. But
ultimately the behavior of acute care governing entities, in terms of structure,
operations, and overall purpose, is very much a function of law, which is the
most significant core element driving the trustee role.2
The difficulty in comprehending the legal role of hospital boards is that
there is no unitary body of law that encapsulates this sector. Rather, the law
here is composed of a series of principles that have evolved over many years,
drawn largely from state statutory and common law.3 The legal principles
affecting governance represent the convergence of the threads related to institutional sponsorship, including charitable trusts, non-profit and for-profit
corporations, and governmentally sponsored entities. The various principles
and corporate foundations combine to form a hospital board that acts as a
fiduciary, a type of overseer vested with final authority over all aspects of the
hospital’s operations and policies.
In attempting to flush out details concerning the role of the board, greater
specificity can be found in examining three particular areas of this diverse
body of law. These areas are hospital licensure and accreditation, foundational
corporation law, and key court decisions on board power and obligations.

2 For

purposes of this article the terms “director(s),” “board of directors,” “board,” “hospital board,” and
“trustees” will be used interchangeably. The term “governance” will be used generically, providing an
overview concept of the entire area. For a detailed overview of legal issues affecting boards, see Robert
C. McCurdy, Governing Boards, in ASPEN HEALTH LAW & COMPLIANCE CENTER, HEALTH LAW MANUAL
180 (2004).
3 Id. For an excellent overview of board law in the non-profit setting, see Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen
Boozang, Mission, Margin & Trust in the Non-Profit Healthcare Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L.
& ETHICS 1 (2005).

HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE

37

Downloaded by [Loyola University Libraries] at 11:15 09 April 2012

B. Public and Private Regulation: Licensure, Accreditation, and
Corporate Enabling Law
For acute care hospitals to operate, regardless of the sponsorship model,
they must hold a valid state license. Licensing, a form of state police power,
has existed widely since the 1950s and details a set of baseline structural and
operational requirements by which hospitals can be surveyed and evaluated.4
Fundamental to all state licensing laws are universal requirements that acute
care institutions must be overseen by a board of directors with both general
and specific responsibilities delineated in law.5
Over time, hospital licensing requirements have been expanded to keep
pace with developments in institutional functions, and they serve as a rather
detailed template for discerning functions of particular parts of these operations, such as those of the governing board.6 For example, under West Virginia
law, the hospital board is charged with overall management and control of the
institution, with specific duties including hiring and evaluating an administrator, approval of medical staff credentialing, quality monitoring, infection
control, regulatory compliance, and fiscal oversight.7 West Virginia law also
includes board mandates for the development of bylaws, an organized committee structure for governance, consumer representation on the board, and a
liaison with the medical staff.8
Related to licensure are two other sets of core regulatory requirements—
the Medicare Conditions of Participation and private regulatory requirements
of The Joint Commission. Both of those contain mandates for boards, and
thus provide further guidance on matters of hospital governance.9
The majority of hospitals participate in the Medicare program, and thus
must comply with federal requirements for acute care structure and operations,
including those that apply to governing boards.10 Medicare delineates six areas
in which boards must act: approving medical staff credentialing and bylaws;
appointing the hospital chief executive officer; ensuring appropriate patient
care; developing an institutional budget and operational plan; providing oversight of contracted health care services; and, if relevant, maintaining adequate
emergency services. In addition to overseeing these mandates, because the

4 John

D. Blum, A Revisionist Model of Hospital Licensure, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 148 (2008).
50 states and the District of Columbia have hospital licensing laws. A good example of such laws
can be found in Illinois, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 (2009). A helpful list of board functions can be found
in MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-13-35 (2009).
6 See Hospital Regulation and Approval Act, WIS. STAT. §§ 50.32-39 (1965).
7 See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5B-1 to 16-5B-17 (2009).
8 Id. § 16-5B-6a.
9 Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2009); THE JOINT COMMISSION, ACCREDITATION
PROGRAM: HOSPITAL, CHAPTER: LEADERSHIP § LD.01.05.01 (2009).
10 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, HEALTHCARE SPENDING AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM: A DATA
BOOK 73 (2009); Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 482 (2009).
5 All
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board has final institutional authority, it would have a general obligation to
see that the hospital meets the regulatory requirements of Medicare falling
under the general Conditions of Participation.11
Beyond licensing laws and the Medicare Conditions of Participation, a
third regulatory point of reference for determining board rules comes out of the
area of private sector accreditation. Although all hospitals are licensed,
the Medicare Conditions of Participation requirement for state review
and certification may be partially waived because private regulators have
been granted “deemed status,” thus giving certain accreditation programs
quasi-governmental power.12 The largest private accrediting body in health
care is The Joint Commission (TJC). Therefore, TJC standards relevant
points of reference for understanding institutional responsibilities, including
governance.13
Under the leadership standards of the TJC, the hospital board is charged
directly with ultimate responsibility for patient safety, quality of care, and
treatment and services. In addition to these broad mandates, TJC standards
include several targeted areas: governance responsibility, including review
and approval of the scope of hospital operations; ensuring adequate resources;
evaluation of hospital performance; institutional conflict resolution; and medical staff collaboration. Private accreditation standards tend to reflect current
industry practices and are designed to cut across a wide spectrum of individual
and system board models.14
Review of corporate laws under which hospitals are established garners
another core set of insights on the roles and functions of boards. These include general corporate enabling laws, non-profit corporation acts, and laws
that underpin public institutions. For example, in the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, considerable details are provided about the roles of boards and
requisite structure and process.15 The model law lists three broad standards of
conduct that directors must follow: good faith; prudent person; and corporate
best interest.16
Special board requirements can be found in public hospital sector laws.
These may be similar to those of other types of government corporations,
with requirements for election of trustees, record keeping, and open meeting
policies.17 Emanating from foundational corporate laws are basic enabling

11 The board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for hospital affairs, which clearly entails fulfillment

of regulatory mandates. Thus, Medicare compliance falls within the ambit of board oversight.
U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006).
13 JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9.
14 Id. §§ LD1.10-LD1.30. Section LD1.30 details the areas noted in the text.
15 REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.01-8.33 (1987).
16 Id. § 8.30(a).
17 See, e.g., 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 910/13-15 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 347.13, 347.25 (2009); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-3534-3536 (2009).
12 42
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documents, articles of incorporation, and bylaws that provide specific details
about individual hospital board operations. Such documents, in turn, reflect
the realities of single and multi-institutional arrangements.18
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C. Common-Law Directions
There is no shortage of regulatory direction concerning the structure,
functions, and operational standards for hospital boards; however, such direction does not necessarily yield guidance about the manner in which directors
must behave in given situations. Thus, to ascertain a more rounded picture of
board behavior, it is necessary to consider how courts view specific mandates
and the concepts of implied authority. The common law attests to the fact
that governing boards possess adequate powers, both explicit and implicit, to
fulfill the recognized mission and roles of a given institution. In determining
what implied authority is present in a given situation, the courts often characterize the board as the institutional fiduciary, having considerable leeway to
steer the hospital in directions that are responsive to the realities of the acute
care sector.19 In the nonprofit sector, as charitable trust principles have given
way to more current concepts of corporate law, such as use of the business
judgment rule, directors are less constrained by strict adherence to charitable purpose and have been able to adopt a more business oriented outlook.
Although exercise of implied power may provide trustees’ greater freedom,
boards must still recognize their legal boundaries, and misconduct may spark
both individual and institutional liability.20
A collective sense of common law frames the director’s fiduciary role
as composed of three primary duties: obedience; due care; and loyalty.21 In
general terms, the courts have required, as a core mandate, that governing
boards exercise sound business judgment in the exercise of financial affairs.22
A somewhat narrower reading of fiduciary responsibilities would also include
obligations of boards to protect and preserve hospital property, ensure the

18 Historically,

hospitals have been established as corporate entities. A snapshot of hospital corporate history can be found in the 1907 articles of incorporation of the Calumet Hospital, available at http://
ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm4/item viewer.php?CISOROOT=/lsc&CISOPTR=2389 (last visited
on Sept. 16, 2009).
19 SOUTHWICK, supra note 1, at 122–28.
20 Id. at 128–31.
21 JAMES P. JOSEPH, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF A DIRECTOR AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
available at http://www.cof.org/files/documents/education collaborations/difficultboards/handout1.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
22 Dan Culica & Elizabeth Prezio, Hospital Board Infrastructure and Functions: The Role of Governance
in Financial Performance, 6 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 862 (2009). A dispute over board
malfeasance occurred recently at Tri-City Hospital in San Diego, where a hospital board dismissed a
CEO and eight executives, calling into question the feasibility of the institution’s governance structure.
See Rebecca Vesely, A Storm in Southern California, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 8, 2009, at 18.
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adequacy of insurance, support risk management functions, develop collection
policies to protect assets, and safeguard against director conflicts of interest.23
The nature of board duty was explored in The Health Alliance of
Greater Cincinnati v. The Christ Hospital (TCH), which involved a dispute
over the hospital’s decision to withdraw from the multi-institutional Alliance
arrangement.24 The TCH board sought to drop out of Alliance because of its
perception of financial improprieties involving Alliance’s attempts to strip the
hospital of its reserved powers, and the fear that the facility would be closed
or relocated. An instructive element in the TCH case is the concept of board
duty, framed by the Ohio Non-Profit Corporation Act and the specific Joint
Operating Agreement in question. The court noted that the TCH board was
required to act with due care and had a good faith obligation to function in
the interests of the institutional mission. The board’s careful review of the
viability of hospital operations, as demonstrated by the formation of a special
board task force and the retention of an outside management consulting firm,
supported evidence that the TCH directors complied with their due care and
good faith obligations. Interestingly, the Ohio court in TCH found an obligation on the part of the system to behave in the best interests of its member
facilities, and held that the Health Alliance had breached its fiduciary duty to
the hospital.25
Some of the most helpful case law in the governance area can be drawn
from disputes between hospital boards and members of the medical staff in the
credentialing area.26 Under both common and statutory law, hospital medical
staffs are independent, self-governing entities. They are delegated the tasks of
appointment, reappointment, and delineation of privileges, activities collectively referred to as credentialing.27 Medical staffs may operate independently,
but their powers, reflected in staff bylaws, are derivative, and final decisional
authority for hospital matters—including appointments and privileging—rests
with the hospital board.
Mahon v. Avera St. Luke’s illustrates how the courts have perceived board
authority in the medical staff dispute area.28 In Mahon, the South Dakota
Supreme Court dealt with a dispute centering on the power of the board.
The appellees, a physician corporation and an individual physician, alleged
23 ROBERT

D. MILLER & REBECCA C. HUTTON, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAW 25-34 (8th ed. 1999). A case
dealing with boards that is well known in the hospital law area is Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l
Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
24 The Health Alliance of Greater Cincinnati v. The Christ Hosp., No. C-070426, 2008 WL 4394738 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2008).
25 Id.
26 Mark A. Kadzielski et al., Peer Review Potpourri: New Developments in Credentialing and Privileging,
15 WHITTIER L. REV. 51 (1994). There is a long history of credentialing disputes between physicians and
hospitals in which medical autonomy directly clashes with board oversight duty.
27 Id.; see also SOUTHWICK, supra note 1, at 585.
28 Mahon v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2001).
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that the hospital board lacked authority to restrict medical staff privileges
and to close staff membership in certain specialty areas. Two central matters
were the state law concerning board powers and the authority of hospital
directors as specified in the institutional bylaws. Under the South Dakota
Non-Profit Corporation Act, directors are charged with managing the affairs of
the corporation. Mahon characterized the board as having a large amount of
discretionary power within the limits of its legal authority and the exercise of
sound business judgment.29 In turn, the court reasoned that the hospital bylaws
provide the board with a foundational power that enabled it to make business
decisions affecting the institution’s medical staff.
Mahon is often referred to as a case dealing with economic credentialing.
In this contentious area, the case underscores the power of a governing entity
to exercise authority in the interests of sound financial management.30
II. A NEW EMPHASIS
A. Broad Reflections
As discussed above, statutory and case law combine to provide both a
general and specific view of the governance role in the hospital sector. The law
of boards is hardly static, but its focus has been one largely played out within
the arenas of regulation, the courts, and hospital management. In recent years,
several developments have occurred to spark interest in governance and, in
turn, lead to changes in the scope of this function. Three major developments
have triggered a broadening focus on acute care governance; they involve
controversies over asset reallocation, concerns over the adequacy of nonprofit hospital community benefits, and a new and expanded emphasis on
hospital board oversight of clinical quality issues, including patient safety.
In general, the issue of corporate governance has been elevated in the
public consciousness. In the 1990s, corporate oversight scandals resulted in
major legislative changes affecting governance, leading to passage of the
2002 Corporate Oversight and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, the socalled Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).31 Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a number of
changes on the operation of boards of publicly traded companies. Changes
included greater disclosure, new conflicts of interest policies, and increased
29 See

S.D. COD. LAWS § 47-23-13 (2009) (illustrating how generic statutory law can be in the board area,
giving boards greater discretion to fulfill their oversight roles).
30 John D. Blum, Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician Relationships, Economics, and Conflicting
Agenda, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (2005); Beverly Cohen, An Examination of the Right of Hospitals to
Engage in Economic Credentialing, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 705 (2004); see also Brad Dallet, Economic
Credentialing: Your Money or Your Life, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 325 (1994); Nicole Huberfeld, Tackling the
“Evils” of Interlocking Directorates in Healthcare Nonprofits, 85 NEB. L. REV. 681 (2007) (detailing
some of the complex issues that arise in multi-hospital system contexts).
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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audit activities.32 Although the non-profit world is not covered by SarbanesOxley, the law has acted as a broad template for outlining governance practices
that all corporations, regardless of sponsorship, should consider. For example,
as a result of SOX it has been suggested that boards increase the number of
independent members, create ethics policies, enhance fraud detection, and
conduct board training on fiscal issues.33
The dramatic failings of major financial institutions have placed attention
on the shortcomings of governing boards.34 Within health care, the 1998
bankruptcy of the Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation,
the nation’s largest non-profit failure, still stands out as a dramatic example
of the ramifications of inadequate governance. It has had a strong effect in the
hospital sector in sparking attention about the need for effective boards.35
B. Three Developments
Of the three previously mentioned developments directing attention to
hospital boards—asset allocation, community benefit, and quality of care—the
first two are representative of the tensions boards face in balancing institutional
mission with the realities of the health care marketplace. In its fiscal oversight
role, the board must make decisions that meet the dictates of business judgment
and respect the idiosyncrasy of third party payer and financial institutions.
Although the majority of financial decisions made by a hospital board can
be viewed as routine, it is those rarer decisions that impact the structure and
operations of the institution, leading to internal and external parties that call
into question board judgment.
No doubt hospital boards of every model and structural iteration struggle
with fiscal challenges, but non-profit board decision making is especially
difficult. Directors of such entities are caught between business and charitable
imperatives. The tensions felt by non-profit directors between economics and
charitable mission go beyond operational realities, but are also manifested in

32 See

generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2004).
33 THE BOARD SOURCE, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, available at http://www.boardsource.org/clientfiles/sarbanes-oxley.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009); see also
Joseph Mead, Confidence in the Non-Profit Sector Through Sarbanes-Oxley Style Reforms, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 881 (2008).
34 SUDHAKAR RAM, FINANCIAL MELTDOWN AND GOVERNABILITY BUSINESS STANDARD, available at http:
//www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=56007 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009); Ben
W. Heinman Jr., Financial Leaders Go AWOL in the Meltdown (Nov. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/Financial Leaders Go AWOL.pdf (last visited Sept. 16,
2009).
35 See, e.g., Lawton R. Burns et al., The Fall of the House of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy, 19 HEALTH
AFF. 7 (2000); Lisa Goldstein, The Failure of AHERF: 5 Important Lessons, HFM MAG., Aug. 2008, at
54.
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the law.36 There is a legal tension between the obligation of directors to fulfill
the charitable purposes of a non-profit hospital, on one hand, that may clash
with a stream of non-profit corporation law strongly requiring directors to
exercise sound business judgment, on the other.
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1. Challenges
A number of high profile cases have been decided in which state attorneys
general have challenged the actions of individual and health system boards
as not meeting the directors’ fiduciary obligations to the charitable mission.37
Under a type of parens patriae argument, state attorneys general, acting on
behalf of the public interest, have challenged hospital decisions to close or
relocate a facility, convert an entity from a non-profit to a for-profit, or spend
sold assets in a particular way.38 In one of the better known cases in this area,
an attorney general’s challenge was brought against the hospital directors’
decision to sell the facility and use the proceeds to fund freestanding clinics.39
In assessing the directors’ conduct, the court found that the decision to sell the
facility failed to meet the two-pronged state test for non-profit board actions;
namely, the transaction was not fair and reasonable and did not advance the
entity’s charitable purpose.40
Other attorneys general challenges affecting board decisions involve
the uses of proceeds earned from the sale of non-profit assets. In Banner
Health System v. Long, a non-profit health system sought to sell its facilities
in North Dakota, South Dakota, and New Mexico and to use the proceeds to
expand services in Colorado and Arizona.41 Banner defended its decision as a
reasonable exercise of business judgment under non-profit corporation laws.
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that use of sale assets was not only a
matter to be evaluated under non-profit corporation law, but if a sale resulted

36 There

is an excellent body of scholarly and practice literature concerning non-profit board law. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE & JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, THE APPLICATION OF NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
LAW TO HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 40–41 (2002) (citing DANIEL KONTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR
NONPROFIT DIRECTORS (1988)); Jill R. Horowitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior,
Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345 (2003); Greaney & Boozang, supra
note 3; Alice M. Maples, State Attorney General Oversight of Economic Credentialing, 37 CUMB. L.
REV. 235 (2006-07).
37 Derivative actions can be brought by private parties challenging public benefit corporations, but the
state attorney general must be notified. See Marion Freemont-Smith & Andras Kocaras, Wrongdoing by
Officers and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995–2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
25 (2002); see also Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004).
38 Phil Kline & Reid Holbrook, Protecting Charitable Assets in Hospital Conversions: An Important Role
for the Attorney General, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (2004).
39 Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) [hereinafter
MEETH].
40 Id. at 594-95.
41 663 N.W.2d 242, 246 (S.D. 2003).
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in a non-just enrichment and hurt local communities, the charitable assets in
question could be characterized as an implied or constructive trust and would
fall under the purview of attorney general oversight.
In another case, the hospital board was motivated by operational loses,
reduction in capital, increased competition, and low reimbursement to sell
assets located in Missouri and Kansas.42 The board had agreed with the Missouri attorney general to transfer the proceeds from the sale to a Missouri
foundation, sparking a challenge from the Kansas attorney general. In the
resultant litigation, the federal district court in Kansas concluded that the hospital board actions should be evaluated under the business judgment rule, but
still found—independent of charitable trust doctrine—that the board of the
Kansas subsidiary did not exercise sound business judgment because it failed
to ensure that the charitable purpose of the organization remained intact after
the sale.
The difficulty in articulating a standard for non-profit board business
accountability is that the legal concept of duty is ambiguous and the judicial
tests are muddled, forging a rather odd hybrid standard mixing charitable and
non-profit law. Such ambiguity in non-profit board decision making hampers
good faith business judgment, particularly for multi-state hospital systems.43
The National Association of Attorneys General supports a Model Act for NonProfit Health Care Conversion Transactions.44 The model law empowers AGs
to review non-profit hospital transactions involving disposition of assets and
alteration of operations, as well as transfer of control or governance. Under the
model act, attorneys general would review questions of fiduciary obligation,
due diligence, economic soundness, and community benefit. Although adoption of the model law may result in more predictable and defined oversight,
it does not alleviate the primary tensions faced by non-profit boards between
economics and charitable mission, and could serve to improperly hamstring
non-profit hospital decision making.
2. Community Benefits
Perhaps an even larger issue in the public eye affecting hospital governance concerns controversies over the community benefit obligations of
non-profit hospitals. Under both federal and state laws, non-profit acute care
facilities are required to offer some type of community benefit, typically (but
42 Health

Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845 (D. Kan. 2003); see Harold Kaplan
et al., The Charitable Trust Doctrine: Lessons and Aftermath of Banner Health, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
28 (2004).
43 Brody, supra note 34, at 937; see also Brody, supra note 34, at n.121 (citing Michael W. Peregrine &
James R. Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Corporate Law Developments in 2002, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 324, 327
(2003)).
44 NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., PROPOSED MODEL ACT FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSION TRANSACTIONS, available at http://www.naag.org/naag/resolutions/res-sum98 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
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not only) charity care, as a type of quid pro quo for tax exempt status. Clearly,
community benefit obligations fall within board oversight duties and are mandated by regulatory requirements as well as general fiduciary duties to fulfill
the institutional mission.
In recent years, controversies have emerged dealing primarily with state
property tax exemptions, in which individual hospitals have been charged with
failing to meet community benefit obligations.45 Often, it is not the failure to
meet non-profit tax requirements that trips controversy, but rather the aggressive posture of a facility in the billing and collection area, especially involving uninsured patients.46 In one publicized situation, Illinois-based ProvenaCovenant Hospital lost its property tax exemption for failure to meet its
charitable obligations and was criticized for its handling of uninsured patient
accounts. In the Illinois Court of Appeals decision resulting from Provena’s
challenge to the loss of its property tax exemption, it was pointed out that the
hospital devoted only 0.7% of its total revenue to charity care.47 The appellate
court held that the institution failed to meet the necessary characteristics of a
charitable institution under state law.48 Individual facility controversies such
as Provena-Covenant prompted a number of state attorneys general to develop
more stringent standards.49
45 Fred

Joseph Hellinger, Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Community Benefits: A Review of State Reporting
Requirements, 34 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 37 (2009); Deanna Bellandi, Bubbling Over Again:
Property-Tax Issues Heat Up in Idaho, Pennsylvania, 27 MOD. HEALTHCARE 38 (1997).
46 Vince Galloro, No Gouging Allowed, 33 MOD. HEALTHCARE 8 (2003).
47 Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 894 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
48 The Provena court first looked to the six distinctive characteristics of a charitable institution laid out in
Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 233 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. 1968):
(1) the institution bestows benefits upon an indefinite number of persons for their general welfare, or the benefits in some way reduce the burden on government; (2) the
institution has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders and does not profit from the enterprise; (3) the funds of the institution are derived mainly from private and public charity and are
held in trust for the purposes expressed in the charter; (4) charity is dispensed to all who need it
and apply for it; (5) the institution puts no obstacles in the way of those seeking the charitable
benefits; and (6) the primary use of the property is for charitable purposes.
Provena, 894 N.E.2d at 460. The Director had found that Provena satisfied only the second characteristic
and determined that not-for-profit status alone did not confer the property tax exemption. Id. at 461. The
court considered the rest of the factors, and did not find Provena to be a gift to the public, nor to relieve
burdens on the state as it still sold medical services, just as for-profit hospitals do. Id. at 462. As Provena
derived a maximum of 3.4% of its revenue from charity, it could not be said it derived most of its funds
from charity. Id. at 463. Regarding the final two characteristics, the court reaffirmed the understanding
that medical care itself is not a charity, as selling something is not generous, and found that the Director
could reasonably have found that Provena could not prove that those without money were cared for
without charge, even if it were able to prove it turned no patient away. Id. at 469.
49 See Press Release, Minnesota Hospital Association, Agreement Between Attorney General and Minnesota Hospitals Will Provide for Pricing to Uninsured Patients, Establish a Code of Conduct for Debt
Collection Practices, available at http://www.mnhospitals.org/inc/data/pdfs/AG agreement press.pdf.
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At the federal level, the failure of hospitals to meet community benefit obligations has sparked heightened Congressional scrutiny and threats
to invoke more stringent institutional requirements for maintenance of federal income tax exemption.50 The pressure placed on non-profit acute care
facilities by ongoing Congressional oversight leads to voluntary, private sector responses. This is seen in the development of new policies by hospitals and their associations in the community benefit area. For example, the
Catholic Health Association has identified a number of factors, such as improving access to health services in a given community, advancing medical knowledge, and reducing burdens on local public health authorities,
as steps hospitals can take to demonstrate their adherence to a charitable
mission.51
Apart from Congressional policy review, the community benefit matter is
squarely rooted in non-profit tax law. Prior to 1969, the federal tax exemption
provided to non-profit tax entities was based on the provision of services to
“those not able to pay,” a standard drawn from traditions forged in the area
of charitable trust law.52 A new standard for exemption was developed by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1969, which recognized promotion of
health for the benefit of the community (in addition to the provision of free
care) as a charitable purpose.53 Over time, both the IRS and the courts have
flushed out details on what constitutes hospital community benefits. Some of
these elements have been incorporated into a required annual filing for exempt
entities, including hospitals.54
In the wake of charity care scandals, Congress placed pressure on the
IRS to revise its annual community benefit reporting requirements.55 The
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-22a01 (West 2008) (for a reference to a
state-based conversion law).
50 John D. Colombo, Hospital Property Tax Exemption in Illinois: Exploring the Policy Gaps, 37 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 493, 496 (2006).
51 What Counts as Community Benefit, Catholic Health Association, available at http://www.chausa.org/
Pub/MainNav/ourcommitments/CommunityBenefits/whatcounts/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
52 Columbo, supra note 50, at 496.
53 John. D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and Healthcare for the Poor,
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 437 (2006).
54 Id. at 437; see also Michele R. Goodman, Putting the Community Back in Community Benefit: Proposed
State Tax Exemption Standard for Nonprofit Hospitals, 84 IND. L.J. 713 (2009). The Goodman article
reviews some of the background history of exemption and expands the discussion into state law. She
is heavily influenced by Mark A. Hall & John Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991), as well as Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable
Status of Non-Profit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307
(1991).
55 Memorandum from Senator Charles Grassley, United States Senate Committee on Finance, to Reporters
and Editors (July 19, 2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2007/prg071907c.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009). For a helpful insight into the nature of Congressional concerns regarding
the shortcomings of tax-exempt organizations, see United States Senate Finance Committee, Staff
Discussion Draft, available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf
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present community benefit reporting mandates involve governing board matters. These include a special schedule for hospitals that mandates reports on
board composition and policies, board business relationships, information on
independent directors, relevant changes in enabling documents, and conflicts
of interest policies.56 The new IRS hospital board reporting obligations reflect
the belief that the structure and operation of the hospital governing authority
are related to the institution’s ability to fulfill its charitable mission.57 Coupled
with the new reporting mandate is the IRS’s governance compliance guide that
provides general focal points for boards. These points include the need for due
diligence, loyalty, and transparency, and highlights specific board functions
such as fund raising, financial auditing, compensation review, and assurance
of document retention.58

3. Quality, the Newest Variable
The third development impacting hospital governance is a related emphasis on engaging boards in improving quality of care.59 There has been
a long-standing oversight responsibility on the part of boards for the quality of care provided within the facility, evident in both common and statutory law.60 The quality obligation can be divided into four particular governance functions: compliance with specific regulatory quality mandates, such
as those established by Medicare; medical staff credentialing; development
of clinical improvement goals for executive compensation; and development
and analyses of patient satisfaction measures in institutional performance
audits.61

(last visited Sept. 16, 2009). The pressure for congressional reform in charity care persists. See Robert
Pear, Hospitals Mobilizing to Fight Proposed Charity Care Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A12.
56 IRS, IRS Exempt Organizations (TE/GE) Hospital Compliance Project Final Report, 149–51, available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/frepthospproj.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
57 Nicholas Wolter, The New IRS Form 990 and Schedule H: What Trustees Need to Know, TRUSTEE MAG.,
Aug. 1, 2009.
58 I.R.S, Governance and Related Topics—501(c)(3) Organizations, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/governance practices.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
59 National Quality Forum, Hospital Governing Boards and Quality of Care: A Call to Responsibility, Dec.
2, 2004, available at http://www.ihi.org/NR/rdonlyres/C75264FA-1703-4DD0-99C2-0355D81DF982/
0/NQFCalltoResponsibilityHospitalBoards2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009); see also Joe McCannon & James Conway, A New Era for Leadership of Quality and Safety, ModernHealthcare.com,
Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://www.modernphysician.com/article/20090116/REG/901159997/1 (last
visited Sept. 16, 2009); Melanie Evans, Raising the Bar for Boards, Mar. 2, 2009, available at
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090302/reg/902279962 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
60 See McCurdy, supra note 2. Perhaps the best known case in the hospital law area acting as a catalyst for
board involvement in quality was Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253
(Ill. 1965).
61 There is no single way to divide up quality activities of a board. Over time, the board role concerning quality activities has expanded. For an excellent discussion of board engagement in quality, see
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Of these four activities, credentialing stands out as the most established
board role in the quality area. Although delegated to the medical staff, this
function is ultimately controlled by the governing authority.62 Credentialing
is illustrative of the board dilemma in quality control, because it entails judgments about medical practice that lay trustees may not be able to make, and
only in cases of overt misconduct can a board exert its authority without
significant medical consultation. Board questions generally are more likely
grounded in financial and managerial issues, and thus boards become highly
dependent on external guidance for the development and analysis of quality
of care matters.63
Nevertheless, trends in patient safety have prompted boards to take on
greater accountability for quality assessment, and a growing appreciation has
emerged about the value of lay perspectives in this area.64 In 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG), the
agency with regulatory responsibility for enforcing Medicare and Medicaid
fraud and abuse laws, identified expanded quality oversight as central to the
governance mandate.65 The OIG, jointly with the American Health Lawyers
Association (AHLA), characterized the board quality role as underpinned by
the duty of fraud and abuse compliance and, more broadly, by the duties of
due care and obedience.66
The OIG/AHLA document does not identify any single tipping point
as the catalyst prompting a new focus on board quality initiatives. Rather,
such emphasis results from a combination of elements, including prevention
of medical errors, the role of sound governance in fraud and abuse corporate integrity agreements, and new regulatory demands such as quality data
reporting and pay-for-performance reimbursement.67 The document details
questions for directors concerning the goals of institutional quality improvement, integration of quality into corporate policies, board education, creation
of metrics for quality measurement, and adequacy of human resources in the
DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRIVING FOR QUALITY IN ACUTE CARE: A BOARD OF DIRECTORS DASHBOARD (2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/roundtableacutecare.pdf
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009); see also Karen Sandrick, Enhancing the Board’s Role in Quality: Research
Examines How Boards Oversee Quality and How They Can Improve, 60 TRUSTEE MAG. 20 (2007).
62 SUSAN B. TAYLOR, THE AUPITA MANUAL OF HEALTH SERVICES MANAGEMENT 172-73 (1994).
63 H. Joanna Jiang et al., Board Oversight of Quality: Any Differences in Process of Care and Mortality?, 54
J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 15 (2009). It also is important for boards to develop effective quality committees,
wherein a higher level of expertise can be established.
64 Sandrick, supra note 61 (noting that board quality oversight presents great challenges). There is no
overall measure for quality, requiring boards to identify and analyze multiple measures of quality; this
task requires extensive time and division of labor that may be hard to accomplish in smaller hospitals.
Legal accountability is the lever that has prompted boards to be active in this area.
65 ARIANNE N. CALLENDER ET AL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY: A RESOURCE FOR
HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (2007).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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quality area. In a subsequent report, the OIG considered ways to improve
a hospital board’s engagement in quality matters and supported the use of
dashboards (a graphic representation) as a vehicle for analyses of complex
clinical data.68
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III. GUIDANCE?
The appropriate use of assets, community benefits, and quality improvement must be viewed against the backdrop of established board mandates. The
challenge for governing entities is to balance their growing set of responsibilities with the more traditional functions of hospital boards, such as financial
oversight and chief executive officer evaluation. The manner in which boards
cope with expanding functions will be colored by sponsorship, and the range
of activities of a particular governing entity will be impacted by the corporate
structure within which it functions.69 Nevertheless, the layering of mandates
that confront all types of governing authorities presents challenges that cut
across the spectrum of hospitals. Considerable introspection concerning the
propriety of the governance function, both within individual facilities and
multi-hospital arrangements, is needed.
There is no shortage of guidance on how a board should function. The
landscape of hospital management is layered with numerous reports on governance, with some written from broad, generic perspectives and others that
are more narrowly oriented. For example, a report issued by the Center for
Healthcare Governance (CHC) in 2007 presents detailed guidance for enhancing board effectiveness in current environments.70 The CHC report identifies
a number of steps for improving boards, including developing a positive culture for governance, setting clear priorities for boards, clarifying roles and
responsibilities, and—if possible—going beyond required fiduciary functions
to a higher level of institutional engagement.71

68 Id.

at 21–27.
a description of the role sponsorship played in one of the two Mayo Clinic hospitals, see http:
//www.mayoclinic.org/saintmaryshospital/sponsorshipboard.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2009). Also,
board function is impacted by status as a whole system board, a hospital board within a system (often
a very limited role beyond licensure and accreditation mandates), or a board in single acute care
facility. See Jeffrey Alexander & Shoou-Yih D. Lee, Does Governance Matter? Board Configuration
and Performance in Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 84 MILBANK Q. 773 (2006).
70 CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE GOVERNANCE, BUILDING AN EXCEPTIONAL BOARD: EFFECTIVE PRACTICES FOR HEALTH
CARE GOVERNANCE (2007); see also LINDA POWELL & CAROL TAYLOR, MOUNTAIN STATES GROUP, HOSPITAL GOVERNING BOARD ASSESSMENT: A SELF-HELP GUIDE (2004); FRANCES S. MARGOLIN ET AL., HEALTH
RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL TRUST, HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE: INITIAL SUMMARY REPORT OF 2005 SURVEY OF
CEOS AND BOARD CHAIRS (2005) (providing information on board practices based on a survey of key
performance indicators); JOHN CARVER, BOARDS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE (3d ed. 2006). Carver presents
the policy governance model, which has been influential across industries.
71 CENTER FOR HEALTHCARE GOVERNANCE, supra note 70, at 22.
69 For
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The Texas Academy of Governance, an educational entity dealing with
health care trustees, recommends a traditional array of board roles. In addition, it stresses the need for boards to represent community needs and
confront broader health system problems.72 The Ontario Hospital Association
recommends an effective framework for governance, including a delineation
of accountabilities, identification of general board and individual directors’
roles and responsibilities, development of director selection and succession
guidelines, adoption of streamlined committee structures, and promotion of
corporate membership that includes community engagement.73
A broader perspective was taken in a Grant Thornton report that evaluated the elements of good governance in 10 high performing health systems.74
This health system report recommended a proactive stance on governance,
calling for a better understanding of a system’s core roles and responsibilities,
a careful consideration of board composition and size, enhancement of board
development and evaluation programs, the adoption of transparent goals for
community health, and an ongoing evaluation of performance benchmarks.75
Both regulators and private organizations have attempted to engage
boards in quality and patient safety initiatives. The Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2004 launched several initiatives with partner organizations to promote the active engagement of hospital leadership in
quality matters, and the agency’s activities on quality reporting and patient
satisfaction have direct implications for board oversight.76 A private entity,
the National Quality Forum (NQF), developed a set of principles that call on
governing boards to review their role in quality and develop expertise in patient safety, clinical care, and performance measurement.77 Boards have been
challenged to take an affirmative role not only to understand quality measures as passive consumers of data, but also to develop their own case studies
of hospital based injuries and evaluate how such occurrences were handled
in their respective institutions.78 It has even been suggested that boards and
72 Texas

Healthcare Trustees Foundation, http://www.tht.org/programs/texas academy of governance/
why are trustees important.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
73 MAUREEN A. QUIGLEY & GRAHAM W.S. SCOTT, HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ONTARIO 34
(2004).
74 LAWRENCE PRYBIL ET AL., GOVERNANCE IN HIGH-PERFORMING COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS (2009).
75 Id.
76 Thomas Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives: Executive Quality
Improvement Survey Results, 2 J. PATIENT SAFETY 2 (2006); see also Press Release, Center for Medicare
& Medicaid Services, CMS Announces Guidelines for Reporting Hospital Quality Data (Jan. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?counter=995 (last visited Sept. 16,
2009); see also CMS, HOSPITAL QUALITY INITIATIVES CAHPS: PATIENTS’ PERSPECTIVES OF CARE SURVEY,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQUALITYINITS/30 HOSPITALCAHPS.ASP (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (detailing the hospital CAHPS survey composed of 27 items, including18 substantive
items that encompass key aspects of the hospital patient experience).
77 NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, HOSPITAL GOVERNING BOARDS AND QUALITY OF CARE: A CALL TO RESPONSIBILITY
(2004).
78 A tool frequently mentioned in discussions of board engagement is a dashboard or scorecard that presents
boards with a graphic depiction of key quality variables. It is estimated that 80% of hospitals use some
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hospital CEOs actively monitor their institutions by engaging in workarounds
of the facility.79
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IV. SO, WHERE ARE WE?
Governance has moved from a backwater of regulation into a focal point
for public and private policy makers. No doubt, the days of boards being pro
forma entities with limited ability to effect change have passed, and a wide
consensus has emerged that hospital boards have untapped value that can be
harnessed to overcome acute care institutional inefficiencies. Regulation in
the board area, both public and private, has expanded and has thrust hospital
boards into a broader array of oversight responsibilities in the three areas
noted above.
Although the common law on governance remains unsettled, it is moving
toward a hybrid corporate governing model, with traditional responsibilities
of corporation oversight combined with fulfillment of institutional mission.
Health policy groups promote the most expansive agenda for boards, and have
provided detailed templates for ways in which governance can be reshaped.
Redirection, however, is not easily accomplished. Beyond specific charges
and the broadly cast duties of financial, managerial, and quality oversight, it is
still largely a matter of institutional self-determination as to how a particular
board deciphers its own roles. Governing authorities must individually face
the challenge of trying to respond to this growing chorus about change amid
realities of operational complexity and the practical limitations of a function
that is part-time and voluntary.
Ironically, with all the attention devoted to governance, there is still a
lack of clarity about what is expected from hospital boards and a sense of
confusion has emerged among the growing layers of mandates. Just what
the core mission of hospital governance is and how that mission can be best
fostered by law remain unclear.
V. LICENSURE AS THE CAPSTONE
In grappling with the question of the core mission of a hospital governing
board, a matter that has been obfuscated in the face of regulatory pluralism,
there are two points of demarcation for analysis. These are a fundamental

type of dashboard or scorecard. The challenge is to select quality variables and make them relatively
short and focused. See Eugene Kroch et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards, 2 J. PATIENT
SAFETY 10 (2006).
79 BRIEFINGS ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND DATA REPORTING, BOARDS KEYED-IN TO QUALITY AT TOP
PERFORMING HOSPITALS (2006), available at http://provider.thomsonhealthcare.com/uploadedfiles/qI
datareport august 06.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
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understanding of the legal nature of the hospital and a basic awareness of the
hospital trustee role.
There are many ways to depict the manner in which law frames the
nature of the acute care hospital, but the most fundamental vantage point
comes from licensure.80 Hospital licensing laws not only serve to protect the
public, but also articulate both broad and specific duties that are the most
fundamental statement of purpose and obligation in this sector. Licensure
empowers hospitals of every type as entities rooted in public purpose, and
that purpose entails treating sick and injured people both individually and
collectively within a given community. Thus, it is health care delivery in a
community context that lies at the root of the licensure obligation, constituting
a core purpose of all hospitals, regardless of type, size, or location. Community
service may not be the sole variable in the hospital panoply of obligations,
but it represents a primary pillar of public duty. It is that pillar that should be
stressed in deciphering the mission of the hospital and that of its leaders, the
board of directors.81
The sum total of general legal and specific governance obligations may
form a type of community service obligation, in that elements such as financial oversight and quality audits benefit the institution and ultimately the
community it serves. Even though a collectivization of board functions may

80 N.Y.

PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2801(10) (2009) (providing a good, generic definition of a general hospital);
Huberfeld, supra note 30, at 706–07 (discussing two distinct missions for hospitals: licensure mission
and charter mission). Huberfeld points out that charter mission concerns the specific type of corporation
involved and is rooted in furtherance of fiscal trust. By contrast, Huberfeld describes licensure mission
as linked to services provided to the community, and mentions that licensure mission could help guide
directors in their service to the organization and its community. I agree with Huberfeld and express
dependence on her analyses for my endorsement of licensure. Although recognizing the need for charter
mission, it is far less central to the core purpose of the hospital, and the regulatory oversight scheme in
which it resides is very tangential to health delivery. I also share Professor Huberfeld’s query about what
boards are supposed to do.
81 The idea that public or private hospitals have a special obligation to community is not a new one. In
1963, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963), a
medical staff dispute case, took the position that hospitals were imbued with the public purpose of
serving the sick and injured and had a special community service obligation. Twenty-five years later, the
Illinois Supreme Court in Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 525 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1988) rejected
the Griesman holding of reviewability of credentialing matters, but underscored the community service
rationale that drove the New Jersey court and underpinned similar cases in New Mexico and Arizona.
Additionally, it can be argued that certificate of need (C.O.N.) laws demonstrate the core community
service component of hospitals. While C.O.N. laws may be widely discredited for their inability to
control health care markets, see Aaron S. King, Medical Market Failure in Maine: Is the Dirigo Reform
Act’s Certificate of Need a Market Connection?, 22 ME. BAR J. 156 (2007), these laws (where they still
exist) focus greater attention on community service. For a current discussion of C.O.N., see ILLINOIS
TASK FORCE ON HEALTH PLANNING REFORM (2009), available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/tfhpr/reports/
TFHPRFinalReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009). The concept of community service permeates the
world of hospital operations, both externally and internally. Although this article focuses on external
community service obligations, internal community service from volunteer bingo to clinical support
team building also falls under the rubric of board oversight.
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underscore public purpose, much of governance is internally focused and
siloed in any given facility or system. A hospital board needs to approach its
role from a distinct public health perspective, in tandem with—but separate
from—other obligations.
The suggestion of coalescing around community service, derivative from
hospital mission, may be viewed as redundant of community benefit obligations driven by non-profit tax law.82 But there is a twofold difficulty in focusing
board obligation on tax law. First, the non-profit tax exemption does not apply
to all hospitals. Second, tax law does not lie at the root of a hospital’s status
and obligations.
Licensure is a more appropriate vehicle for framing the hospital mission
and related duties, including governance, and its underdevelopment should
not be viewed as necessitating more regulators to step into a void. The fundamental role of trustees has not changed, regardless of the expanding nature
of obligation.83 Boards and their individual members are overseers, lay stewards, and—even factoring in legal liability and final approval power—their
oversight must be guided by those with clinical and operational expertise,
actualized by realistic parameters and effective committee structures.
To effectuate a better sense of mission and a realistic view of the governing function, the focus of regulation needs to shift to licensing as the core
reference point for the trustees’ role. For this to occur, a broad reform of
licensing must take place. Licensing laws are hardly dormant, and are frequently amended to reflect changes in the industry and responses to pressure
from CMS.84 The licensure scheme, however, is not a strong one, as it is
beholden to state budgets and an odd interplay with federal and private sector

82 Community service should not be just a matter of tax exemption law but must extend beyond a checklist

to a more fundamental sense of obligation on the part of boards. As things stand, the IRS has made
considerable progress in developing policies on board roles and community service mandates, but there
are still ambiguities. See Letter from Marcus S. Owens, Attorney, Caplin & Drysdale, to Eric Solomon,
IRS Secretary for Tax Policy (Jan. 14, 2009) (on file with author).
83 A great deal has been written in the legal and health management literature about the trustee role.
However, ruminations on the trustee function written 37 years ago seem as germane today as when
written.
The lot of the hospital trustee is not always a happy one, especially if he believes all the
misconceptions concerning his legal responsibilities. He is likened at times to the trustee of a
trust fund. He is told he is the owner of the hospital property and charged with its management;
that he must handle hospital funds with the same degree of care used in handling his own
funds, that he is personally responsible for the quality of medical care in the hospital; that he
is individually liable for negligence causing injury to a patient. Were all these opinions legally
valid, few of our distinguished citizens would hazard the personal risks entailed in hospital
trusteeship.
Hyatt et al., supra note 1, at 119.
licensing laws are frequently amended and become touchstones for appreciation of new developments. See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85; 42 C.F.R. § 482.21 (2009) (exemplifying changes in hospital

84 Hospital
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standards.85 Beyond its threefold layering, hospital licensure invites further
regulatory pluralism. It is hardly viewed as a font of creativity and innovation,
but rather as a sort of underfunded backwater, inviting other parties to promote
alternative regulatory initiatives. Although harsh criticism of hospital licensing laws may be unwarranted, these schemes need to be improved to regain
legitimacy. As they now stand, they are unlikely candidates for anchoring the
governance function. Thus, the frameworks of licensing regulation should be
revisited and a search for alternative models undertaken.
VI. A NEW GOVERNANCE LICENSURE MODEL
One general approach to refocusing board direction in the licensure
context can be garnered from the broad and somewhat amorphous area collectively referred to as new governance.86 New governance is a term applying
to a series of theoretical and applied approaches to regulation. It carves out a
middle ground between the typical administrative law command and control
models of oversight, on one hand, and self-regulation, on the other. There
is no single model of new governance; rather there are a series of evolving
models that have been developed and tried in various industries around the
globe.
For example, an alternative regulatory structure for health care can be
found in the use of the ISO 9001 standards for purposes of Medicare deemed
status.87 ISO 9001 is not without detail, but it is a process that stresses quality
in ways that provide institutions latitude to develop programs compatible with
their individual environments.88

Conditions of Participation); CTR. FOR IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTHCARE QUALITY, SYNOPSIS OF THE 2008 JOINT
COMMISSION STANDARDS FOR ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS (illustrating that amendments are frequently made
to accrediting standards of The Joint Commission and the American Osteopathic Association), available at http://www.cihq-hacp.org/images/pdf/HACP%20Study%20Resource%20-%202008%20Joint%
20Commission%20Acute%20Care%20Standards.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009). For an interesting addition to hospital governance in Ohio, where the relevant statute has been amended to encourage boards
to work across hospitals to create efficiencies, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.21 (2009).
85 John D. Blum, A Revisionist Model of Hospital Licensure, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48 (2008).
86 There is a large body of literature dwelling on new governance that cuts across borders and industries.
See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Narrowing the Gap? Law and New Approaches to
Governance in the European Union: New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity Rivalry
and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Government in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004);
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Sividal, Strengthening Intentional Regulation Through Transnational
New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009); Louise
G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 137 (2006).
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Within the rather broad arena of regulatory reform, there are two particular models of new governance that can be drawn on in licensing reform: management based regulation and responsive regulation.89 Management based regulation is oriented around planning, and calls for regulated entities to develop
and comply with their own constructed solutions to particular problems.90 Responsive regulation is based on the application of a hierarchy of government
interventions that run from a hands-off approach (a type of self regulation) to a
traditional direct regulatory intervention triggered by a failure of the regulated
entity to meet public goals.91
A redesigned licensure model drawing on elements of management
based and responsive regulation could be constructed in three primary parts.
The initial phase of a new model would retain core entry requirements, namely,
the baseline set of structural and operational mandates that would ensure
quality and uniformity across the sector. This is not to suggest that entry
requirements would remain static; on the contrary, this core needs to be
frequently evaluated and updated as changes in clinical medicine and the
nature of the hospital industry occur. Baseline licensing requirements are
highly visible and effective mechanisms to bring change.
The second part of a revised licensing model concerns self-assessment
and adoption of problem solving strategies. This would involve a bottom-up
process, in which a facility (or system) would identify problem areas, analyze the etiology of a problem, collect supporting data, and craft solutions.
This phase of the licensure model is heavily influenced by management based
regulation, and rests on the notion that self-assessment and problem solving
would improve outputs.92 Like core regulation, problem solving would entail regulator involvement to assist hospitals and, drawing from responsive
regulation, intervene when self-regulation fails.
The third phase of new licensure entails the development of institution
specific obligations that would be developed through negotiation between the
regulator and the hospital. This element of licensure, unlike problem solving,
is not self-directed, but rather is one that would involve the significant initial
and continued involvement of public authorities and would be driven by a
balance of need and cost sensitivity.
The three-part model for translating reformed licensure into governance
can be illustrated by considering each element. The refocus on baseline entry
89 Cary

Coglianes & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003); see JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., THE GOVERNANCE
OF HEALTH SAFETY AND QUALITY: A DISCUSSION PAPER, AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR SAFETY AND QUALITY IN
HEALTHCARE, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (2005).
90 Coglianes & Lazer, supra note 89.
91 Blum, supra note 85; see also IAN AYNES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995).
92 See Coglianes & Lazer, supra note 89.
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requirements would touch all hospital parts, involving the governing board
as the final institutional authority. It would require the addition of specific
obligations based on fluid conditions in acute care health delivery. This part
of licensure is no different than current regulation, except that it would need
to be highlighted across regulatory sectors as the touchstone for changes in
governance and could, in turn, be shaped by a strong sense of community
mission and a realistic view of what functions lay trustees can undertake.
The second part of the model—problem solving—is in sync with trends in
governance that call for introspection by boards concerning their roles and
active engagement in institutional matters, particularly in quality and patient
safety.93 A specific mandate for governing authorities to engage in problem
identification and resolution could act as a guiding principle to actualize such
behavior in ways that current advisory mandates cannot. State authorities may
act as consultants here, and may be very valuable in decision making in areas
such as quality software selection.94
The third part of a reformed licensing program—the creation of negotiated obligations—would provide a very helpful mechanism to go beyond rote
regulatory templates and accommodate board obligations to local needs. This
phase could be designed to recognize that variables such as institutional size,
local health market composition, and economics should be factored into the
public expectations carved out for governing boards.95 It is here that regulators may promote board engagement directed toward community service, and
what one board may be charged with could in some ways be quite different
than another would be. Regulators would also have the power to mandate
cross-institutional planning and activities to maximize resources and meet the
health needs of populations within regions.
There is no doubt the three-part licensure model suggested will call for
some major changes on the part of state regulators. As such shifts in state
regulatory process occur, the involvement of CMS and private accrediting
authorities will also be needed.
93 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 85.
94 iHealthBeat, EHR Software Glitches

Exposed VA Patients to Medical Errors (2009), at http://www.
ihealthbeat.org/Articles/2009/1/14/EHR-Software-Glitches-Exposed-VA-Patients-to-Medical-Errors.
aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
95 Variation among hospitals is recognized in terms of finances, quality, and patient-mix; see DRAFT REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY MAINE’S HOSPITALS (Dec. 22, 2004) (on file with author); see also NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON HEALTH
CARE FACILITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007), available at http://www.nyhealth.gov/facilities/
commission/docs/implementation of the report of the commission.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
A proposal developed by the American Association of Medical Colleges would utilize teaching hospitals
as vehicles to coordinate health care innovation zones. Such zones would mandate that tertiary care
centers coordinate health services across an array of geographic providers in particular areas, and
presumably would engage hospital boards in more meaningful service coordination. See DARRELL G.
KIRCH, AM. ASS’N MED. COLL., CAN MEDICAL EDUCATION “FIX” THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM? (2009), available
at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept09/word.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).

HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE

57

Downloaded by [Loyola University Libraries] at 11:15 09 April 2012

CONCLUSION
It is hard to deny that an effective board can have a beneficial impact on
hospital operations, but it is difficult to appreciate the parameters of its role
and even harder to identify the core mission of governance. The law in this
area is deep and convoluted, drawing together threads of charitable trust and
corporate doctrine in common-law and statutory contexts across the span of
many years. Starting from a position of relative inattention, hospital boards
have moved into a sea of directives, driven by growing numbers of public and
private regulators and policy groups, and sparked recently by issues of asset
allocation, community benefit, and quality.
Governance can be improved, but for that to happen, a more unified
regulatory approach needs to be developed. The licensing function is the most
logical regulatory process to act as a central force in channeling a new form
of public oversight of governing entities. Hospital licensure is a fundamental,
well established control process that exists to protect citizen health. It can act
as the primary mechanism for delineating the obligations of governance.
However, as state licensing currently stands, many regulatory actors see it
as a flawed process, giving it little credence and thus underscoring the need for
reforming this apparatus. A reformed licensure system that takes ownership of
governance questions is necessary not only to dampen regulatory pluralism,
but—more importantly—to help state authorities to better frame the core
community health mission of hospital boards and clarify the boundaries of the
trustee role. The foundation for a revised licensing process can be drawn from
the regulatory theories of new governance. The model called for in this article
is a hybrid of two primary theories, management and responsive regulation,
that combine to stress self-direction and active engagement between hospitals
and regulators to craft programs tailored to local needs.
The core functions of governance concerning finances, executive review,
and quality would not be abandoned, but should become part of an adjustable
baseline, more informed by a realistic view of the board’s oversight capabilities. The value added in this reformed model is a board that is encouraged
to tailor its activities to local needs, protected by a regulatory scheme that
encourages collaboration across institutions. Boards can become agents for
change, but for that to occur, the ethic of compliance must be replaced by a
more coherent and grounded vision of purpose and capacity.

